



































Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Florence School of Regulation 
The Welfare and Price Effects of Sector Coupling with 
Power-to-Gas 
 


















European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 




The Welfare and Price Effects of 
Sector Coupling with Power-to-Gas 
 
  
 Martin Roach and Leonardo Meeus 
 




This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 





© Martin Roach and Leonardo Meeus, 2019 
Printed in Italy, July 2019 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 







Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, created in 1992 and currently directed by 
Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the 
major issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place 
in 21st century global politics. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, 
projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The 
research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, 
reflecting the changing agenda of European integration, the expanding membership of the 
European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world. 
For more information: http://eui.eu/rscas 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s). 
Florence School of Regulation 
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) is a partnership between the Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies (RSCAS) at the European University Institute (EUI), the Council of the European 
Energy Regulators (CEER) and the Independent Regulators Group (IRG). Moreover, as part of the EUI, 
the FSR works closely with the European Commission. 
The objectives of the FSR are to promote informed discussions on key policy issues, through workshops 
and seminars, to provide state-of-the-art training for practitioners (from European Commission, National 
Regulators and private companies), to produce analytical and empirical researches about regulated 
sectors, to network, and to exchange documents and ideas. 
At present, its scope is focused on the regulation of Energy (electricity and gas markets), 
Communications & Media, and Transport. 
This series of working papers aims at disseminating the work of scholars and practitioners on current 
regulatory issues. 
 
For further information 
Florence School of Regulation 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies  
European University Institute  
Casale, Via Boccaccio, 121 
I-50133 Florence, Italy  
Tel: +39 055 4685 878  
E-mail: FSR.Secretariat@eui.eu 






Electricity markets with high installed capacities of Variable Renewable Energy Sources (VRES) 
experience periods of supply and demand mismatch, resulting in near-zero and even negative prices, or 
energy spilling due to surplus. The participation of emerging Power-to-X solutions in a sector coupling 
paradigm, such as Power-to-Gas (PTG), has been envisioned to provide a source of demand flexibility 
to the power sector and decarbonize the gas sector. We advance a long-run equilibrium model to study 
the PTG investment decision from the point of view of a perfectly competitive electricity and gas system 
where each sector’s market is cleared separately but coupled by PTG. Under scenarios combining PTG 
technology costs and electricity RES targets, we study whether or not there is a convergence in the 
optimal deployment of PTG capacity and what is the welfare distribution across both sectors. We 
observe that PTG can play an important price-setting role in the electricity market, but PTG revenues 
from arbitrage opportunities erodes as more PTG capacity is installed. We find that the electricity and 
gas sector have aligned incentives to cooperate around PTG, and instead find an issue of misaligned 
incentives related to the PTG actor. Although not the focus of our analysis, in some scenarios we find 
that the welfare optimal PTG capacity results in a loss for the PTG actor, which reveals some intuition 
that subsidizing PTG can make sense to reduce the cost of RES subsidies. A sensitivity analysis is 
conducted to contextualize these findings for system specificities. 
Keywords 





Electricity markets with high installed capacities of Variable Renewable Energy Sources (VRES) 
experience periods of supply and demand mismatch, resulting in near-zero and even negative prices, or 
energy spilling due to surplus. Ambitious Renewable Energy Sources (RES) targets and Greenhouse 
Gas (GHG) emissions reduction objectives in the EU could aggravate this problem further. The 
participation of emerging Power-to-X solutions in a sector coupling paradigm, such as Power-to-Gas 
(PTG), have been envisioned to provide a source of demand flexibility to the power sector and 
decarbonize the gas sector. For many reasons, the analysis of sector coupling strategies are gaining 
increasing attention from policy-makers.  
The European Commission states that a sector coupling approach to energy technologies and 
infrastructure allows for the optimal use of available resources, the avoidance of stranded assets and the 
best provision of information for investment decisions (European Commission, 2018). In a report 
commissioned by European Parliament, the authors state that the concept of sector coupling has 
broadened to now include supply-side integration which focuses on the integration of the power and gas 
sectors through technologies such as PTG (European Parliament and Trinomics B.V., 2018). In another 
report commissioned by the European Commission, the authors state that according to gas Transmission 
System Operators (TSOs), an integrated energy infrastructure building on the existing electricity and 
gas systems would in principle be more efficient, resilient, sustainable and less expensive than an all-
electric energy infrastructure (European Commission and Trinomics B.V., 2018). Finally, in a report 
commissioned by the Council for European Energy Regulators (CEER), the authors state that PTG can 
be used to absorb and store electricity by converting it into hydrogen in case of surplus renewable 
electricity, and later it can be used as a transport fuel, converted back to electricity or injected into the 
natural gas network (CEER and KEMA Consulting GmbH, 2018). 
A coherent sector coupling strategy is increasingly demanded by stakeholders across energy sector 
value chains. In a report commissioned by a consortium of gas TSOs, the authors emphasize the 
reliability and flexibility value which gas grids ensure, and put forward that the infrastructure can be 
used to transport renewable methane and hydrogen to meet ambitious climate objectives (Gas for 
Climate and Navigant Consulting, 2019). According to the International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA), hydrogen from renewables has the technical potential to channel large amounts of renewable 
electricity to sectors for which decarbonization is otherwise difficult (IRENA, 2018). Business case 
analyses for various PTG market applications are carried out by ENEA Consulting (2016) and DNV GL 
(2018). They find that significant cost reductions in electrolyzer technology, access to inexpensive 
power and greater penetrations of VRES are identified as critical factors in this regard. Market failures 
and other barriers persist for hydrogen adoption in industry and are described in more detail by the 
World Energy Council (2018).  
Research conducted by academics has focused on the economic potential of PTG in different applied 
settings. A case study on linking electricity and gas networks to produce hydrogen via PTG in a city in 
Japan was investigated using a simulation model. The authors found that the required optimal 
electrolyzer size increases with increasing the PV fraction ratio of combined renewable production (Li 
et al., 2019). Another case study on the production of hydrogen via PTG is conducted for France (Tlili 
et al., 2019). The authors find that the potential of hydrogen production in France using electricity 
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surplus is overestimated unless you take into account interconnections which can impact flexibility 
needs of the electric system. PTG is studied from the point of view of portfolio effects of holding 
different generation and PTG technologies using a stochastic Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) 
in Lynch et al. (2018), but they assume a fixed gas price to represent the gas sector. They find that the 
participation of PTG has the potential to make other technologies more or less profitable. The role of 
PTG in a sector coupling – electricity, gas and CO2 – framework is modeled by Vandewalle et al. (2015). 
They observe PTG setting the electricity market price in a 100% VRES electricity system and flexibility 
requirements in the gas system increasing due to PTG’s participation. A review of academic studies for 
a basic understanding of electrolysis technologies used in PTG can be found in Buttler and Spliethoff 
(2018) and for the storage role of PTG in Blanco and Faaij (2018).  
However, with few exceptions, the previously cited reports and academic studies overlook the 
potential misalignment in incentives to install PTG. If the support for PTG from the electricity and gas 
sector diverges due to the impact PTG’s presence may have on the redistribution of welfare across 
sectors or market players, then investments in PTG may never materialize. The aim of this paper is to 
study the PTG investment decision from the point of view of a perfectly competitive electricity and gas 
system where each sector’s market is cleared separately but coupled by PTG. We study whether or not 
there is a convergence in the optimal deployment of PTG capacity and what the welfare distribution is 
across both sectors.  
MCPs have been advanced for a large range of problems found in the energy sector and have certain 
advantages inherent in combining the optimization problems of multiple agents and in constraining 
primal and dual variables together, which has motivated this chosen method (Gabriel et al., 2013). 
Similar alignment in incentives has been studied for transmission investment in interconnectors between 
countries to cost-effectively integrate RES using a MCP formulation, but the authors only considered 
an electricity system (Saguan and Meeus, 2014). MCP formulations have also been used to model 
wholesale gas markets while incorporating gas demand from the electric power sector, but the direct 
participation of sector coupling assets such as PTG is absent (del Valle et al., 2017). Inspired by the 
previous sector-specific MCP models, we propose a stylized long term equilibrium model which is built 
up using a MCP formulation. We study the welfare distribution and price effects at sector optimal 
capacities of PTG to know if we can expect a misalignment in incentives between the electricity and gas 
sector at the long-run equilibrium.  
This paper is organized in two main sections. Section 2 describes how we build up the model and the 
underlying assumptions. Section 3 details the results from a numerical example. Lastly, our key findings 
are summarized in the conclusion.  
2. Methodology 
First of all, our modelling approach is described in Section 2.1. Second of all, the mathematical 
formulation is provided in Section 2.2.  
2.1. Modelling Approach 
Our stylized model simulates the long-run equilibrium of an integrated wholesale electricity and gas 
market which have sector specific market clearing constraints coupled through the participation of an 
exogenously given installed capacity of PTG. The electricity and gas market are perfectly competitive. 
The model is depicted schematically in  
Figure 1. Multiple iterations are executed in the model, for each iteration investment in PTG capacity 
increases by 50 MW increments, reflecting the lumpiness of such investments, and the market clearing 
conditions lead to an equilibrium in the electricity and gas market simultaneously. In each iteration, the 
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operation of the PTG assets responds to prices in both markets under a short-run profit constraint and is 
constrained by its installed capacity.  
Figure 1: Schematic overview of market coupling with PTG, including references to the 
optimization problems (1)-(16) of the agents (cf. Section 2.2)  
 
For each model run, we analyze the evolution of sector welfare and total welfare as PTG capacity is 
increased in order to identify sector-specific equilibrium and system optimal points. The model is 
designed for an energy system that has l periods, where each period is Tl hours and ∑ (Tl)𝑙∊𝐿 =
8760 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 . The formulation uses representative hours, so the market clearing prices and quantities 
solved at a per period resolution are extended to all hours in Tl . 
2.2. Mathematical formulation 
In this section, the decision-making problems of all agents are presented. The dual variables associated 
with each constraint are given in between parentheses.  
2.2.1. Electricity Market 
Conventional generators 
The decision variables of each conventional generation technology s are its installed capacity 𝑔𝑠 and its 




𝐸𝐿 − 𝑉𝐶𝑠 − 𝜆𝑙
𝐺𝑎𝑠) •
𝑙∊𝐿
𝑥𝑙,𝑠 • 𝑇𝑙) − 𝐶𝐶𝑠 • 𝑔𝑠 (1) 
 Subject to 
 0 ≤  𝑥𝑙,𝑠 ≤  𝑔𝑠 , ∀𝑙 ∊ 𝐿, ∀𝑠 ∊ 𝑆   ( 𝜌𝑙,𝑠
− , 𝜌𝑙,𝑠
+ ) (2) 
  0 ≤  𝑔𝑠 ,   ∀𝑠 ∊ 𝑆 (𝜉𝑠) (3) 
Each generator maximizes its profit, subtracting its operational and investment costs from its market 
revenues. For each generation technology type s, variables costs are defined as VCs and annualized 
investment costs as CCs. Since the conventional generators later introduced are Gas Fired Power Plants 
(GFPP), the price of gas 𝜆𝑙
𝐺𝑎𝑠 is also included as a variable cost component in the optimization problem. 
Through constraint (2), production in a given period is constrained by the installed generation capacity 
in all periods. We assume that conventional generation is 100% available over the year. When a 
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generation technology type s is producing at its maximum, 𝜌𝑙,𝑠
+ ≥ 0, the generator uses the dual variable 
to bid into the electricity market. In this way, the generator acquires scarcity rents which contribute to 
recovering its investment costs. 
Renewable generators 
The decision variables of each renewable generation technology r are its installed capacity 𝑔𝑟𝑟 and its 




𝐸𝐿 − VCRr) •
𝑙∊𝐿
𝑥𝑟𝑙,𝑟 • Tl) − CCr • 𝑔𝑟𝑟 + ∑(𝑔𝑟𝑟 • 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚 • Tl)
𝑙∊𝐿
  (4) 
 Subject to 




  0 ≤  𝑔𝑟𝑟 , ∀𝑟 ∊ 𝑟 (𝜋𝑟)  (6) 
Renewable generators are confronted with a similar profit maximization as conventional generators, 
subtracting their operational and investment costs from their market revenues. However, an additional 
revenue stream is received from a subsidy scheme for renewables which takes the form of an hourly 
capacity-based premium. Variable costs are defined as VCRr and annualized investment costs CCRr. 
Through constraint (5), production is constrained by the installed generation capacity and its availability 
factor 𝑔𝑟𝑟 •  AVAl,r in each period. The renewable generator spills its production whenever it cannot be 
absorbed by demand. Spillage is not an active decision variable in our model, but can be calculated at 
equilibrium in each period as: spillage = ∑  (𝑔𝑟𝑟 •  AVAl,r) − 𝑥𝑟𝑙,𝑟𝑟∊𝑅  
Electricity Consumers 
Electricity consumers are inelastic and have no decision variables in their objective to minimize costs 
(7). They are price takers in the electricity market and carry the total subsidy costs associated with the 






• Dl • Tl) − (𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚 • 𝑔𝑟𝑟 • Tl)) (7) 
Electricity Market Clearing Constraint 
The electricity market clearing constraint (8) endogenously determines the market price 𝜆𝑙
𝐸𝐿 for each 
period with the objective of minimizing total energy costs for the electricity sector. The renewable target 
constraint (9) requires that a percentage of gross electricity consumption must be met by non-spilled 
RES electricity production calculated on an annual basis. An exogenous RES target is based on 
consumption of inelastic consumers while any incremental demand from PTG is automatically served 
by RES that is spilled. The dual variable of this constraint re-enters the renewable generator optimisation 








) + (∑ 𝑥𝑙,𝑠
𝑠∊𝑆
) − Dl − 𝑑𝑝𝑡𝑔𝑙) • Tl • 𝜆𝑙
𝐸𝐿) (8) 
 Subject to (9) 
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∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑟𝑟
𝑟∊𝑅𝑙∊𝐿
• 𝑇𝑙 − (RENTARGET • ∑(Dl
𝑙∊𝐿
• Tl)) − ∑(𝑑𝑝𝑡𝑔l • Tl)
𝑙∊𝐿
≥ 0  (𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚)  
 𝜆𝑙
𝐸𝐿 ≥ 0 ∀𝑙 ∊ 𝐿 (𝜂𝑙
𝐸𝐿) (10) 
2.2.2. Gas Market 
Shippers and Long Term Contracts 
A shipper may have a portfolio of Long Term Contracts (LTCs) in which price formulas may differ due 
to execution date, indices, flexibility, among others, therefore a simplified procurement cost function 
was assumed, which has also been similarly used in del Valle et al. (2017). Given we do not attempt to 
model strategic behavior of gas shippers, we represent the perfectly competitive outcome of multiple 
shippers as one shipper with one procurement cost function. This shipper’s procurement cost function 
is represented by an affine function with intercept LTCint  and slope LTCslope. The objective of each 




∑((LTCint + LTCslope • 𝑞𝑙,𝑐)
𝑙∊𝐿
− 𝜆𝑙
𝐺𝑎𝑠) • 𝑞𝑙,𝑐 (11) 
 Subject to  
𝑞𝑙,𝑐 ≥ 0 , ∀𝑙 ∊ 𝐿, ∀𝑐 ∊ 𝐶 (𝜇𝑙,𝑐) 
(12) 
Conventional Demand Gas 
Gas consumers have an inelastic demand DGl and have the objective to minimize costs (13) but they do 
not have any decision variables. Gas consumers are price-takers, but they do not contribute to the subsidy 
scheme to support renewable electricity generators. 
 
 Minimize  
∑ 𝜆𝑙
𝐺𝑎𝑠 •  DGl • Tl
𝑙∊𝐿
    (13) 
Gas Market Clearing Constraint 
The gas market clearing constraint endogenously determines the market price 𝜆𝑙
𝐺𝑎𝑠 with the objective of 






) − DGl − ∑(𝑥𝑙,𝑠)
𝑠∊𝑆
+ (𝑑𝑝𝑡𝑔𝑙 • CONV)) • Tl  • 𝜆𝑙
𝐺𝑎𝑠) (14) 
 Subject to 
𝜆𝑙
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2.2.3. Power-to-gas  
Market Coupling 
PTG arbitrages perfectly between the electricity and gas market while taking into account the exogenous 
conversion efficiency CONV and price in both markets 𝜆𝑙
𝐸𝐿 and  𝜆𝑙
𝐺𝐴𝑆. As a load in the electricity market 
and a supply source in the gas market, PTG operations 𝑑𝑝𝑡𝑔𝑙 is the two-sided decision variable linking 
the markets together. The PTG’s market coupling role solves the optimization problem (16)-(17). 







𝐺𝐴𝑆) − (𝑑𝑝𝑡𝑔𝑙  •  𝜆𝑙
𝐸𝐿)) • Tl) − (PTGCAP • PTGINVC) 
(16) 
 Subject to 





Detailed in the following section, we advance a stylized numerical example in order to analyse the 
welfare and price effects of electricity and gas market coupling with PTG. 
3.1. Numerical Example 
3.1.1. Electricity Market 
The stylized electricity market is composed of two sets of generation technologies: two conventional 
generators – Open Cycle Gas Turbine and Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT & CCGT) – and one 
renewable generator (i.e. wind). Data assumptions for these generation technologies are based on a study 
conducted by the Belgian electricity TSO, Elia (2017). Each generation technology has a representative 
new-built capacity costs and variable costs (excluding fuel, emissions and personnel costs). These Gas 
Fired Power Plants’ (GFPP) variable costs are higher for OCGT than for CCGT which accounts for 
differences in conversion efficiencies. Both GFPP face the same fuel costs due to purchases on the gas 
market, which when summed together are the total variable costs in operations. The annualized 
investment costs were determined based on a 20 year economic lifetime, weighted average cost of capital 
of 6% and assumed fixed operation and maintenance costs for each technology. Lastly, annual 
availability factors were assigned, 30% of installed capacity for RES and 100% for conventional. A 
summary of the data assumptions appears in Table 1. 
Table 1: Generators data assumptions 
Technology Variable costs €/MWh: 
VCs& VCRr 
Annualized investment costs 
€\MW.year: CCs&CCr 
Availability % 
CCGT 2 94 500 100% 
OCGT  11 64 500 100% 
RES –  
i.e. wind 
0 159 000 30% 
The demand of inelastic electricity consumers is represented by a Load Duration Curve (LDC) Dl =
22000 𝑀𝑊 − 1.37 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 which is taken from Joskow (2006). This LDC is subdivided into 10 periods 
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of 876 hours each. Therefore, the instantaneous balance between supply and demand is not incorporated, 
nor are ramping or other technical generation constraints.  
3.1.2. Gas Market 
The stylized gas market is comprised of two sets of gas supplies: the renewable gas from hydrogen 
injected by PTG and conventional natural gas accessed via LTCs by shippers. Both are considered 
perfectly substitutable and measured in €/MWh. Here we assume no alternative gas supplies from LNG 
or other renewable gases to the gas market. We represent the outcome of perfectly competitive shippers 
as a single LTC procurement cost function. We take the assumed gas price of 18 €/MWh as in Lynch et 
al. (2018) for the LTC intercept and add a LTC slope as in del Valle et al. (2017) for the upward sloping 
LTC procurement cost function of a shipper.  
Intercept of Long Term Contract € Slope of Long Term Contract €/GWh 
18 .25 
The electricity sector’s GFPP and inelastic gas consumers are the two sources of demand participating 
in the gas market. The GFPP are elastic in responding to gas prices and are therefore another linking 
asset participating in both the electricity and gas market simultaneously. The inelastic gas consumers 
have equal demand in each period and this demand was derived in such a way that the inelastic electricity 
and gas demand are of equal size. The inelastic gas demand per period was determined by taking the 
annual inelastic electricity demand in MWh from the LDC and dividing it by the number of hours. 
Therefore, this gas demand is uncorrelated with the electricity LDC. This is also a shortcut in the model 
because gas storage is not included nor are correlations between electricity and gas estimated.  
3.1.3. Power-to-gas 
The primary driver of PTG investment costs is the technology costs of electrolyzers. A recent report by 
Agora Verkehrswende et al. (2018) provide a summary of current and future electrolyzer costs which 
have been estimated in various studies. We assume a conversion efficiency of 80% for electrolysis in 
line with this report forecasted for future low temperature electrolysis. Given the costs of the PTG 
installation will evolve into the future, PTG investment cost is a parameter that we vary with the 
following range of: 0, 200, 500 and 1000 in €/kW. These investment costs are annualized based on a 25 
year economic life, 6% WACC and 2% of capital costs for fixed O&M, taken from Enea Consulting 
(2016).  
3.1.4. Renewable energy targets discussion 
Following a revision of the Renewable Energy Directive in the Clean Energy for all Europeans Package 
in 2018, the EU has set a binding renewable energy target of 32% of energy from renewable sources in 
the Union’s gross final consumption of energy by 2030 (European Union, 2018). Gross final 
consumption of energy includes energy needs for industry, transport, heat and electricity. According to 
the accompanying Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, how each 
Member State (MS) will contribute to the achievement of this goal, alongside additional objectives for 
energy efficiency improvements and greenhouse gas emissions reductions, will be further detailed in its 
National Energy and Climate Plans for the 2021-2030 period. Each MS’s 2020 renewable energy targets 
will be the bare minimum that must be met. Many MSs have pursued RES targets via the deployment 
of renewables in the electricity sector, and we utilise an electricity RES target as a given for our stylized 
setting. Ambitious and binding RES targets send a clear market signal and incentives for RES 
investment, and is included in our model for this reason.  
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3.2. Results 
First, a baseline in which the long-run market equilibrium when an RES target is set and no PTG is 
installed is explained. The baseline is the reference point to which the later welfare analysis will be 
compared.  Second, the price effects of PTG on the electricity and gas markets will be discussed. Third, 
the impacts of PTG on sector and total welfare will be summarized with an accompanying sensitivity 
analysis. Fourth, limitations of our model and approach are discussed. 
3.2.1. Baseline - case without power-to-gas  
The case of no PTG provides a baseline for later making a comparison of the impact of PTG on 
electricity and gas markets. In this case, the electricity market has only one source of demand defined 
by the inelastic LDC over 10 periods and the optimal mix of generation technologies is selected such 
that the exogenous RES target set is satisfied. In requiring a specified percentage of energy consumed 
to be supplied by renewables, the RES target drives a minimum amount of renewable capacity to be 
installed, as depicted for multiple RES targets in Figure 2. The RES capacity required to satisfy a given 
RES target must take into account the 30% annual RES availability factor to obtain firm capacity. 
Without a RES target, no RES would be installed because it is not the least cost resource participating 
in the market.  
Figure 2: Impact of RES Targets on RES Capacity Installed 
 
 
Spillage only occurs at RES targets greater than 65% and the amount of spillage is the area underneath 
the RES target line and above the LDC. For each incremental 5% RES target above 65%, the marginal 
quantity of RES capacity installed increases due to spillage. RES Capacity investment decisions are 
strongly dependent on the RES target set. Given an RES target of 95%, the RES capacity required is 
60,415 MW and this results in a firm capacity of 18,125 MW. 
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As depicted in Figure 3, for this scenario energy spillage occurs in low demand periods. The remaining 
generation capacity is met by the least cost GFPP technology, which will produce in peak demand 
periods. 
Figure 3: Baseline in Electricity Market for 95% RES Target 
 
The electricity market price is cleared for each period and extended to all 876 hours in that period.  When 
spilling of RES occurs in a period, the market clearing price is 0 €/MWh. Otherwise, it is set either by 
the conventional generator’s variable costs according to the merit order or by scarcity pricing in peak 
periods for the recovery of fixed investment costs based on the dual variable of the generator’s capacity 
constraint. Given RES is not the least cost technology, the capacity-based RES premium is 
endogenously determined to make-up for insufficient electricity market revenues such that RES 
generators recover investment costs and meet its zero profit condition. 
Electricity consumers benefit when electricity market prices are 0 €/MWh when RES place 
downward pressure on prices. However, at the same time, the out-of-market capacity-based premium is 
a subsidy costs borne by electricity consumers to support higher RES targets. As illustrated in Figure 4, 
higher RES targets increase total costs for electricity consumers in the case with no PTG because of 
significant subsidies for RES generators. 
Figure 4: Impact of RES targets on Sector Welfare with no PTG 
 
In the same instance of no PTG, the gas market has only one source of supply being the shipper’s LTC 
to satisfy both the demand of inelastic gas consumers and GFPPs. The impact of RES targets on the gas 
Martin Roach and Leonardo Meeus 
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market takes place through the participation of GFPP. When GFPP capacity is substituted in favor of 
RES capacity due to higher RES targets, this directly affects the quantity of gas demanded from the gas 
market, as depicted in Figure 5. This reduction in demand lowers procurement cost for the shipper and 
translates into lower gas prices which end up benefiting inelastic gas consumers. 
Figure 5: Impact of RES Targets on Gas Market Demand 
 
3.2.2. Case with power-to-gas  
3.2.2.1. Price Effects 
When PTG is introduced into the model, its participation affects price formation in the electricity market 
through its arbitrage objective as a market coupling agent. Here the price effect induced by PTG 
participating in the electricity market is described in detail. When renewables are spilled in a given 
period, the electricity market price is 0 €/MWh. In a given period, if you do not have enough PTG 
capacity installed to evacuate all of this spillage, the price remains 0 €/MWh. On the other hand, similar 
to what has been observed in Lynch et al. (2018) & Vandewalle et al. (2015), once the spillage is 
absorbed in a given period, the electricity price is set by the perfectly competitive participation of PTG 
based on its short term zero profit conditions. This condition ignores sunk investment costs, meaning 
PTG operates as long as the electricity it consumes and subsequently converts into hydrogen can be sold 
for at least the price on the gas market. This inter-fuel arbitrage can be reached through reorganizing 





) ≥ 𝐺𝑎𝑠𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑙  ∀ 𝑙 
For example, if the gas market price is 20 €/MWh, then at a 80% conversion efficiency, the competitive 
price set by PTG in the electricity market is 16 €/MWh. However, it is possible that there is insufficient 
PTG capacity to evacuate all of the renewable spillage in all periods. This leads to PTG setting the 




The Welfare and Price Effects of Sector Coupling with Power-to-Gas 
European University Institute 11 
Figure 6 illustrates a scenario in which a RES target of 95% leads to spillage in multiple periods and 
therefore an incentive for PTG to be installed to absorb it. As more PTG capacity is installed, the 
electricity market price is set by the inter-fuel arbitrage and eventually takes effect in all periods. This 
explains why the maximum PTG revenues occurs at 4500 MW where the arbitrage margins of PTG’s 
gas sales in periods with 0€/MWh electricity prices are substantial, but as more capacity is added there 
is an erosion of its revenues from arbitrage. Therefore, adding greater installed capacities of PTG 
reduces the revenues until it reaches its long-run perfectly competitive outcome. The downward spikes 
in PTG profits reflect this price-setting effect of PTG in a period and appears large due to the market 
clearing price in a period extending over 876 hours at a time. Zero profits are reached at 6950 MW 
although marginal deviations from the precise optimal can also be explained by lumpiness in increments 
of PTG capacity and the number of hours in each time period used. 
Figure 6: Within a Scenario Analysis 95% RES Target & 0 PTG Investment Costs 
 
When higher PTG investment costs are considered, arbitrage profits must be significant enough to 
recover its investment costs. As a result, the PTG plant may not be profitable, except when PTG installed 
capacity is limited such that it does not absorb all spillage and the arbitrage revenues in these zero price 
periods make investment recovery possible. In the next subsection, this price-setting behavior will be 
analysed with respect to the impact on sector and total welfare. 
3.2.2.2. Welfare Effects 
Each combination of RES target and PTG annualized investment cost form a single scenario to analyse 
the impact of PTG on electricity and gas markets. For each scenario, in iterating from the baseline of 0 
MW of PTG capacity by increments of 50 MW, we obtain a frontier of perfectly competitive outcomes 
which are sector equilibrium points representing optimizing agents. 
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A scenario of 95% RES and 200 €/kW PTG investment costs illustrated in Figure 7 demonstrates the 
welfare analysis process applied to all scenarios. The baseline welfare for each sector is a nominal 
welfare amount measured in millions of € to which change in welfare is compared for equilibrium points 
of the iterated PTG capacities. The long-run equilibrium can be identified by when total welfare, which 
is the sum of electricity welfare, gas welfare and PTG profits, is maximized. This grid search for agent-
specific welfare and total system welfare equilibrium points confirm whether a misalignment in 
incentives is present.  
Figure 7: Example of Scenario in Welfare Analysis 
 
In this example, we do not observe a misalignment between sectors. In this scenario, the optimal 
equilibrium point for total system welfare is maximized at 5750 MW of PTG. Both the electricity and 
gas consumers benefit from PTG at the total welfare optimal equilibrium. For scenarios which have a 
positive change in total welfare and therefore an installed capacity of PTG greater than 0, both the 
electricity and gas sector benefit. The rationale underlining welfare changes across equilibrium points 
as more PTG is added will be explained further.  
The positive welfare improvement in the gas sector can be explained by how PTG participates as a 
new supply source in the gas market. The gas market price formation is strongly dependent on the LTC 
procurement cost function. When the domestic supply source of hydrogen replaces some LTC imports, 
there is a slight downward pressure on gas prices, as observed in Vandewalle et al. (2015). This slight 
decrease in the gas price positively benefits gas consumers in a positive way, although marginally. Given 
this is a long-run equilibrium model, producer surplus of gas shippers is 0. 
The positive welfare improvement in the electricity sector can be explained by how PTG 
productively uses otherwise spilled renewables and reduces the costs of the renewable premium for 
electricity consumers.  The renewable energy premium is endogenously determined by the model to 
offset any market revenue shortfall of renewable generators such that RES investment costs are 
recovered. PTG, when deployed, can absorb spillage and thereby improves the capacity factors of the 
renewable generator’s fleet and plays a price-setting role in the electricity market. As previously 
discussed, PTG absorption of zero marginal cost renewables can have direct price effects on the 
electricity market, leading to a price greater than 0 €/MWh. This price increase negatively affects 
electricity consumers. However, this loss is compensated by the reduction in the premium due to higher 
The Welfare and Price Effects of Sector Coupling with Power-to-Gas 
European University Institute 13 
capacity factors of renewables which receive a non-zero price for their production. Overall, the net 
impact of the price making behavior of PTG on electricity welfare is positive, signifying that the gains 
from the reduction in renewable premium costs are greater than the loss from higher prices in the power 
market. Given this is a long-run equilibrium model, producer surplus of all generators is 0. 
Note however we do observe a small issue with misaligned incentives related to the PTG actor. At 
the optimal welfare point, the PTG actor is making a loss. In the above scenario, this loss is partially 
explained by lumpiness. Note that this lumpiness can decrease after introducing smaller increments in 
PTG capacity and/or introducing more demand periods1. However, we noticed from some scenarios the 
issue is more than only lumpiness. In a couple scenarios, as in Figure 8, PTG is always loss-making, but 
is welfare optimal to invest in it at 1250 MW. The intuition behind this observation is that subsidizing 
PTG can make sense to reduce the cost of RES subsidies. 




                                                     
1 We checked for this issue of lumpiness relative to these two parameters.  
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Another impact of PTG on the electricity market is the renewable premium amount needed by RES 
generators. When PTG is setting the electricity market price above 0 €/MWh, then more market revenues 
support renewable investment recovery, thereby replacing part of the out-of-market capacity based 
premium. For the 95% RES target and 200 €/kw PTG investment cost scenario, this reduced dependence 
on the out-of-market capacity based premium is depicted in Figure 9. At the welfare optimal installed 
capacity of 5750 MW, the premium was reduced by 13% of total RES costs in favor of market-based 
revenues.  
Figure 9: Breakdown of RES Generators' Revenue from Electricity Market and Out-of-market 
Capacity Based Premium 
 
However, the renewable premium is designed to complement revenues recovered from the market and 
for this reason is sensitive to the electricity price. If the electricity price is sufficiently high, either due 
to high commodity prices (i.e. gas or CO2 prices), then it is possible RES generators can recover more 
revenue through the market and reduce the reliance on the premium. For this reason, this is a stylized 
observation. Similarly, dependence on a RES premium is also relative to the total investment costs which 
must be recovered. As RES investment costs decrease further into the future as they become more cost 
competitive, it follows that the RES premium could also reduce. 
Here we see that moderate amounts of PTG capacity can significantly contribute to the reduction of 
spilled renewables. Spillage is reduced by 95% to 1,029 TWh from 20,629 TWh after installing 5,750 
MW of PTG in the above scenario. Moderate amounts of PTG can significantly reduce RES spillage. In 
another scenario with PTG investment cost of 500 €/kw, at 85% and 95% RES targets, the optimal 
installed capacity of PTG of 1250 MW and 4450 MW reduces spillage by 51% (3.153 TWh) and 84% 
(17.278 TWh), respectively. 
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Table 2 provides a summary of the optimal installed capacity of PTG for multiple scenarios covering 
different combinations of RES targets and PTG investment costs. The positive total welfare 
improvement is calculated relative to the baseline of 0 MW of PTG for an exogenous RES target. For 
all scenarios, the positive change in total welfare (M€), if observed, is listed in the second row beneath 
the colored cell which states the optimal installed capacity of PTG (MW). In the third row, PTG profit 
(M€) is listed to further discern the lumpiness effect. The cell is colored in orange to highlight the two 
scenarios in which PTG is always loss-making activity but welfare enhancing. PTG installed capacity 
is 0 MW when there is a negative change (- Δ) in total welfare, which means that if PTG is not installed 
because it is not welfare enhancing nor profitable. 
Table 2: Welfare Analysis - Base Case 
 
From our stylized model, we observe that both the RES target and PTG investment costs are important 
factors in making the business case. A 0 €/kw represents a particular case in which PTG is free or entirely 
subsidised with the burden not falling on electricity nor gas consumers. The optimal PTG capacity in 
this case would be enough to absorb 100% of the spillage for any given RES target. At high RES targets, 
more spillage occurs across more periods which improves the capacity factor of PTG if installed. At 
high PTG costs, the welfare benefits for the electricity and gas sector do not often outweigh the PTG 
investment costs. The installed capacities of PTG found in this table describe a particular sector coupling 
configuration and is subject to change based on power system characteristics. These factors will be 
considered in the subsequent sensitivity analysis. 
1000 500 200 0
0 0 0 500
- Δ - Δ - Δ 8 M€
-           -           -           0 M€
0 0 250 1450
- Δ - Δ 3 M€ 28 M€
-           -           -1 M€ 0 M€
0 50 1300 2500
- Δ 1 M€ 19 M€ 65 M€
-           0 M€ -6 M€ 0 M€
0 1250 2450 3650
- Δ 4 M€ 58 M€ 126 M€
-           -25 M€ -12 M€ 0 M€
0 2650 3900 5100
- Δ 37 M€ 132 M€ 228 M€
-           -16 M€ -21 M€ 0 M€
900 4450 5750 6950
6 M€ 117 M€ 265 M€ 396 M€
-9 M€ -30 M€ -33 M€ 0 M€
4450 7200 9600 10800
140 M€ 429 M€ 684 M€ 890 M€
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3.2.2.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis is carried out in order to characterize the impact of power system characteristics 
on the welfare optimal deployment of PTG. The two most prominent parameters under consideration 
are the RES availability factor specified in each period and the slope of the LDC. In the base case, the 
RES availability factor is a constant 30% in all periods. For an RES installed capacity of 75000 MW, 
the firm capacity provided is then 22500 MW for each hour in all periods. In the base case, the LDC is 
upward sloping at a rate of 1200 MW per period. The difference between the peak (22000 MW) to 
baseload (11200 MW) leads to a demand spread of 10800 MW. These sensitivities highlight how the 
potential of PTG can significantly vary from the base case resulting from system-wide parameters which 
impact energy spillage.  
The first set of sensitivities provide alternative RES availabilities which are represented graphically 
in Figure 10. As the electricity LDC is not ordered time series, when the RES availability is not constant 
across all periods, a different specified correlation between electricity demand and RES availability is 
assumed. Instead of estimating a precise correlation in this regard for a specific geographical location 
or RES resource, two availability cases – positive and negative correlation with LDC - were considered. 
Each of these cases has an equal average availability as the base case.  
For any given renewable capacity installed, a negatively correlated availability (AVA negative) 
defines RES production to be lower in high demand periods than low demand periods. As RES targets 
increase, more RES capacity is required to meet high demand periods and additionally more spillage 
occurs in low demand periods, when compared to the base case. On the other hand, a positively 
correlated availability (AVA positive) defines RES production to be higher in high demand periods than 
low demand periods. In this case, spillage is generally reduced in all periods to meet an RES target, 
when compared to the base case. These differences in installed PTG capacity are summarized in scenario 
tables in the Appendix. For the same scenario of 95% RES target and 500 €/kw for PTG costs, the PTG 
installed capacity is nearly four times greater in the negatively correlated availability case compared to 
the positively correlated one.  
Figure 10: RES Availability Sensitivities 
 
Another relevant sensitivity simulates the effect of halving the 30% RES availability factor (AVA half), 
specifying a 15% RES availability factor instead. This modification doubles the RES installed capacity 
required to provide an equal amount of firm capacity, thereby doubling the RES capacity investment 
necessary.  
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The second set of sensitivities provide alternative shapes of LDCs which could represent underlying 
power system characteristics such as seasonality related to demand types observed in a typical year 
which cause the demand spread between peak load and base load to vary. For example, electric instead 
of gas used for residential heating applications which typically follow a seasonal temperature dependent 
pattern could cause a larger demand spread. Two cases are illustrated in Figure 11, a flat and steep LDC, 
which are of equal size in gross electricity consumption and have the same 30% RES availability factor 
as the base case. For a more steep LDC, spilling begins at lower RES targets (30%) and there is more 
spillage overall compared to the base and flat LDC cases. These differences in installed PTG capacity 
are summarized in scenario tables in the Appendix. The most evident observation is when spilling 
actually begins whether at 35% in the flat LDC case or 85% in the steep LDC case. Although these are 
stylized LDCs represented, reshaping the LDC is a crucial input for determining optimal PTG installed 
capacity. 
Figure 11: Electricity LDC Sensitivities 
 
The cases examined in the sensitivity analysis each hold a different baseline – market and premium costs 
for electricity consumers when no PTG is installed – considering all possible RES targets, as explained 
in Section 3.2.1. These cases can be cross-compared through the change in costs for increasing RES 
targets incrementally by 5%, as depicted in Figure 12. This cost analysis for electricity consumers 
directly captures the impact of system parameters on the electricity welfare baseline. When the costs are 
increasing over an RES target range, PTG has an opportunity to contribute to welfare improvement. 
Figure 12: Comparison of Electricity Consumer Cost for Incremental RES Targets Across 
Sensitivities 
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3.2.3. Limitations of our approach and implications for conclusions 
In what follows, we first discuss why our sensitivity analysis is incomplete, and then discuss the 
implications for the kind of conclusions we can draw from our analysis. 
First, why is our sensitivity analysis incomplete? We did illustrate that the conditions under which 
PTG becomes profitable and significantly improves the welfare of the electricity and gas system, 
depends on the renewable energy push that is put on that system and the detailed characteristics of that 
system. There are many factors that play a role, and we did not model all of them. Some omissions imply 
that we are underestimating the impact of PTG, while others imply that we overestimating the impact 
of PTG. An illustration of underestimation is that we assume a constant 30% RES availability factor 
while actual firm capacity provided by RES could be lower in certain periods. Also we do not model 
the ancillary services markets, which might be an additional source of revenue for PTG, and an 
additional system benefit that this technology could deliver. Profitability of PTG could also be improved 
by the industrial demand for hydrogen, either through renewable electricity ‘green hydrogen’ or through 
pre-combustion Carbon Capture and Storage ‘blue hydrogen’, which is also additional revenue that is 
not considered in the current version of our model. An illustration of overestimation is that we focused 
on PTG as the only means to absorb RES spillage. In practice, however, the competitive landscape offers 
a diverse set of participating technologies and pathways to market to deal with the system imbalances 
that VRES may cause. We do not claim by any means that PTG is the only sector coupling technology 
to be studied. Further research may eventually show our findings to hold for other power conversion 
technologies, such as Power-to-heat, Power-to-liquids and batteries.  
Second, what are the limitations of our approach and what implications does this have for the kind 
of conclusions we can draw from the analysis? This model has not been designed to forecast under 
which assumptions PTG will become profitable and impact the electricity and gas system. As stated in 
the introduction, we did develop the model to check if we should be concerned about misaligned 
incentives between the relevant actors in the system. If PTG would become profitable and welfare 
improving, will the electricity and gas actors spontaneously come together and invest in this technology, 
or should regulators anticipate that the investment risks to be sub-optimal so that intervention might be 
needed. In other words, who will benefit from PTG and will we automatically converge to total welfare 
maximization or is the distribution of welfare such that we might not reach the optimal point. This is 
what our model has been designed for, and what we focus on in our conclusions. Of course, the model 
also gives insights on when PTG might become profitable, but these insights need to be treated more 
carefully so we decided not to highlight them in our conclusions. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyzed the welfare and price effects of sector coupling with PTG. We advanced a 
stylized equilibrium model in order to identify potential misaligned incentives between the relevant 
actors in the electricity and gas system. In a numerical example, we studied the long-run coupled market 
equilibrium in multiple scenarios combining electricity RES targets and PTG investment costs. Across 
scenarios, we studied the price effect induced by the participation of PTG in the electricity market and 
the impact on the gas market. Within each scenario, we compared the sector and total welfare optimal 
installed capacity of PTG and distribution of welfare to identify misaligned incentives.  
Our three main findings are the following. 
First, in order for PTG to recover its investment costs, arbitrage profits must be significant enough. 
As more PTG capacity is installed, we observe a peak and then erosion of arbitrage revenues. This is 
due to PTG’s price setting role based on the inter-fuel arbitrage in the electricity market when sufficient 
capacity is installed which can absorb energy spillage. In some scenarios, the optimal level of PTG 
investment corresponds to a loss for the involved actor.  
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Second, when PTG is installed in a scenario, signifying a positive impact on system welfare, PTG 
absorbs spillage which benefits electricity consumers thanks to a reduction in the RES capacity-based 
premium. At the same time, gas consumers benefit from PTG’s alternative supply which reduces gas 
market prices through a decreased dependence on Long Term Contracts. Therefore, misaligned 
incentives between sectors may be limited.  
Third, a sensitivity analysis highlights key electricity system parameters, including the correlation 
between the electricity Load Duration Curve (LDC) and availability of RES, as well as the shape of the 
LDC. Given these system characteristics, it is possible to determine the need for and value that PTG can 
bring as a means to evacuate spillage. 
We derive two main sector coupling conclusions from these findings.  
First, in scenarios in which PTG is profitable and welfare improving, electricity and gas consumers 
both benefit from lower prices. This suggests that these sectors have an incentive to cooperate around 
PTG. We had to analyse all the welfare and price effects to come to this important conclusion.  
Second, even if it was not the focus of our analysis, we did discover another issue. In some scenarios, 
total welfare is maximized at the level of PTG investment that is loss-making for the PTG investor. The 
intuition is that subsidizing PTG can make sense to reduce the cost of RES subsidies. This then opens 
the debate for PTG investment support via subsidies and/or grid tariffs. 
In other words, we did not find an issue with misaligned incentives where we were expecting to find 
it, but we did find it where we were not looking for it.  
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Sensitivity Analysis Tables 
RES Availability correlation with LDC 
  
 
1000 500 200 0
0 0 0 400
- Δ - Δ - Δ 6 M€
0 0 0 1200
- Δ - Δ - Δ 20 M€
0 0 850 2050
- Δ - Δ 12 M€ 49 M€
0 600 1850 3050
- Δ 9 M€ 45 M€ 101 M€
1650 2850 3950 5150















Sensitivity - RES availability positively 





1000 500 200 0
0 0 0 550
- Δ - Δ - Δ 9 M€
0 0 500 1700
- Δ - Δ 7 M€ 37 M€
0 650 1850 3100
- Δ 2 M€ 39 M€ 95 M€
0 2150 3350 4550
- Δ 6 M€ 85 M€ 171 M€
0 3600 4850 6050
- Δ 8 M€ 130 M€ 244 M€
0 4450 6700 7900
- Δ 41 M€ 217 M€ 366 M€
1300 4450 9200 10450
8 M€ 137 M€ 380 M€ 578 M€
3700 6150 12000 13200
16 M€ 255 M€ 567 M€ 819 M€
4450 10600 17200 18450
140 M€ 572 M€ 1009 M€ 1361 M€
Sensitivity - RES availability negatively 
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l Period of load duration curve 
s Conventional technologies  
r  Renewable technologies 
c  Long term contracts 
  
1000 500 200 0
0 0 0 250
- Δ - Δ - Δ 4 M€
0 0 0 1200
- Δ - Δ - Δ 20 M€
0 0 0 2100
- Δ - Δ - Δ 35 M€
0 0 650 3100
- Δ - Δ 9 M€ 63 M€
0 0 1700 4150
- Δ - Δ 24 M€ 98 M€
0 300 2750 5200
- Δ 1 M€ 45 M€ 139 M€
0 1450 3950 6400
- Δ 4 M€ 82 M€ 198 M€
0 2700 5150 7600
- Δ 11 M€ 123 M€ 262 M€
0 4050 6550 9000
- Δ 36 M€ 187 M€ 352 M€
0 4450 8050 10500
- Δ 74 M€ 265 M€ 459 M€
0 4800 9700 12150
- Δ 129 M€ 365 M€ 590 M€
1950 6850 11750 14200
11 M€ 228 M€ 516 M€ 780 M€
4450 9450 14350 16800
53 M€ 381 M€ 737 M€ 1050 M€
7350 14650 19550 20750




















1000 500 200 0
0 0 0 250
- Δ - Δ - Δ 4 M€
0 0 650 1250
- Δ - Δ 10 M€ 32 M€
0 1300 1950 2550
- Δ 19 M€ 67 M€ 115 M€
2400 4150 4800 5400


















Sensitivity - Flatter Load Duration Curve
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Parameters 
Type Name Description Unit 
Demand 𝐷𝑙 Electricity demand in period l  MW 
𝐷𝐺𝑙 Gas demand in period l MWh 




𝐶𝐶𝑠 Annual investment capacity cost for 
conventional s 
€/MW 
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑟 Annual investment capacity cost for renewable 
r 
€/MW 
𝑉𝐶𝑠 Variable cost for conventional s €/MWh 
𝑉𝐶𝑅𝑟 Variable cost for renewable r €/MWh 
𝐴𝑉𝐴𝑟,𝑙 Availability factor for renewable r in period l  % 
𝐿𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑐 Intercept of simplified procurement cost 
function of long term contract c 
€ 
𝐿𝑇𝐶𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑐 Slope of simplified procurement cost function 
of long term contract c 
€/MWh 
Power-to-gas PTGCAP Power-to-gas capacity installed MW 
PTGINVC Annual investment capacity cost for power-to-
gas  
€/MW 
CONV Conversion efficiency of power-to-gas % 
Renewable 
Policy 




Type Name Description Unit 
(Primal) 
Variables 
𝑥𝑙,𝑠 Generation of conventional plant s in time 
period l 
MW 
𝑔𝑠 Maximal generation (capacity) of conventional 
plant s 
MW 
𝑥𝑟𝑙,𝑟 Generation of renewable plant r in period l MW 
𝑔𝑟𝑟 Maximal generation (capacity) of renewable 
plant r 
MW 
𝑑𝑝𝑡𝑔𝑙,𝑝 Demand of power-to-gas p in period l MW 






+  Dual variable for maximal production 
constraint for conventional plant s in period l  
€/MWh 
𝜌𝑙,𝑠
−  Dual variable for non-negativity 𝑥𝑙,𝑠  
𝜉𝑠 Dual variable for non-negativity 𝑔𝑠  
𝜇𝑙,𝑟
+  Dual variable for maximal production 
constraint for conventional plant r in period l 
€/MWh 
𝜇𝑙,𝑟
−  Dual variable for non-negativity constraint 𝑥𝑟𝑙,𝑟  
𝜋𝑟 Dual variable for non-negativity constraint 𝑔𝑟  
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚 Dual variable for RES target constraint  €/MW.h 
𝛿𝑙
+ Dual variable for maximal consumption 
constraint for power-to-gas in period l 
€/MWh 
𝛿𝑙






𝐸𝐿 Electricity price for demand period l €/MWh 
𝜆𝑙
𝐺𝑎𝑠 Gas price for demand period l €/MWh 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚 Renewable energy premium  €/MW.h 
Martin Roach and Leonardo Meeus 
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